Jessica Tillipman | Senior Editor
Jessica Tillipman is a senior editor of the FCPA Blog.
She’s the Assistant Dean for Government Procurement Law Studies and Government Contracts Advisory Council Professorial Lecturer in Government Contracts Law, Practice & Policy. She also teaches Anti-Corruption & Compliance, a course that focuses on anti-corruption, ethics, and compliance issues in government procurement, and regularly advises foreign governments and companies on anti-corruption and compliance issues.
Prior to joining GW Law, Dean Tillipman served as a law clerk to the Honorable Lawrence S. Margolis of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and was an associate at Jenner & Block, where she specialized in Government Contracts and White Collar Criminal Defense.
Dean Tillipman is also a co-chair of the American Bar Association, International Anti-Corruption Committee. She frequently organizes and presents at domestic and international government procurement and anti-corruption conferences and colloquia, and her legal commentary has been featured in numerous domestic and international media outlets. She has also published numerous articles that address legal and policy issues involving anti-corruption, government procurement, white-collar crime, and government ethics law.
Dean Tillipman is a member of the bars of the United States Court of Federal Claims, the state of Virginia, and the District of Columbia. She graduated cum laude from Miami University (Oxford, OH) in 2000 and obtained her JD, with honors, from the George Washington University Law School in 2003.
[Editor’s note: Jessica Tillipman of the George Washington University Law School asked her fellow FCPA Blog editors for recommendations of anti-corruption, compliance, and enforcement sites. The responses became yesterday’s post. She also sent around her own list, and graciously permitted the FCPA Blog to publish it. It appears below. — rlc]
Critics said offering a whistleblower reward without requiring employees to report internally would undermine company compliance programs. New surveys demonstrate that these concerns may be overblown.
As noted in FAR 9.406-1(a), “It is the debarring official’s responsibility to determine whether debarment is in the Government’s interest . . . [t]he existence of a cause for debarment, however, does not necessarily require that the contractor be debarred.”
Now that we have firmly established that neither suspension nor debarment may be used to “punish” contractors, let’s go over the mechanics of FAR 9.4.
As contractors like BAE and Siemens have settled large (FCPA-related) enforcement actions with the U.S. Government, there has been an epidemic of misleading and erroneous statements made about the role of suspension and debarment in the FCPA context.
This is the first post in a series that will provide a broad overview of the U.S. administrative S&D regime, a discussion of recent legislative activity, and information about comparable debarment regimes that may also be triggered by the bribery of foreign government officials.
There’s a reason why you don’t see many of the biggest U.S.-based government contractors on the FCPA top ten list (e.g., Lockheed, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Northrup, Boeing, etc.).
No company, regardless of its size or industry, is immune from potential FCPA liability if it does business abroad. Why then, has “FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar” by Drury Stevenson and Nicholas Wagoner, singled-out and declared war on large government contractors? Because it can—large government contractors are not sympathetic.